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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No.
14543

FRED L. EATON.
Defendant-Appellant•

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with unlawful distribution
for value of a controlled susbtance, to-wit: heroin, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(1) (a) (i) (1953), as
amended«
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury and was found
guilty on March 18, 1976, in the Second Judicial District
Court, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, presiding.

On April

4, 1976, the trial court sentenced appellant to an indeterminate term not to exceed fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the judgment of the jury and the sentence imposed by the
trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In his brief appellant recites "facts" which were
not in evidence at his trial, giving his version of what
occurred for the first time on appeal rather than at the
trial court level in his defense.

The faces revealed by

the record are as follows:
On December 9, 1975, an undercover narcotics1
agent for the Ogden City Police, Ken Goode, made a "controlled buy" of heroin at the residence located at 823
West Ellis Street, Ogden, Utah (Tr.36-49,105,123,128-136).
Ken Goode testifed that at approximately 1:00 p.m. on
December 9, 1975, he set up a herein purchase for about
3:00 p.m. later that same day at the West Ellis residence
(Tr.128,129), and that he contacted Ogden police officers,
Mosher, Searle and Burnett about this proposed buy (Tr.128).
Robert Searle, Ogden City police officer in the narcotics*
division, testified that on December 9, 1975, he and some
other police officers met with Ker Goode at the Copper
-2~

Cottage at approximately 3:00 p.m. to discuss this proposed buy (Tr.40,41).

At this meeting, Searle stated

he gave Goode $200 to make the buy and conducted a body
search of him to determine that he had no money of his
own or any narcotic

drugs on him (Tr.41).

Searle

testified that Goode's wife, Charlene, was present with
him at the Copper Cottage and that she too was searched
(Tr.40,41).

Searle also testified that Goode's car was

searched by Detective Burnett (Tr.42,73).

Officer Searle

indicated that from the time Ken Goode left the Cooper
Cottage to the time he returned to the Copper Cottage
after the sale was completed, Goode was under police
surveillance with the exception of the few minutes
Goode spent at 823 West Ellis Street (Tr.42-45).

The

officer estimated that the total time Goode spent inside
the residence was approximately five minutes (Tr.44).
When Goode returned to the Copper Cottage after making
the buy, Searle testified

he turned over eight balloons

of suspected heroin to the police (Tr.44,45,81).

Searle

and the other police officers involved in this heroin buy
testified that they observed nothing at all unusual about
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Ken Goode's behavior or speech patterns that afternoon
either before or after the heroin buy (Tr.43f44,104,113F116,
240) .
Gerald Burnett, an Ogden City police officer,
corroborated Officer Searle*s testimony, testifying
that he searched Ken Goode's automobile (Tr.l02f109-112),
finding no drugs (Tr.103), and that he observed Goode go
to the residence at 823 West Ellis Street and enter it
alone at about 3:46 p.m. and exit it at approximately
3:50 p.m. (Tr.103).

Burnett testified that Detective

Taylor searched Goode1s vehicle when he returned to the
Copper Cottage (Tr.l04)«
Both Searle and Burnett testified that they
knew Ken Goode was a heroin addict (Tr.36f107,118)f but
that at the time of this incident they knew he was on a
methadone program (Tr.36,114).

Officer Searle testified

that it was necessary to use a heroin addict in this case
because it might have been necessary for the "buyer" to
shoot some of the heroin himself:
W

Q. Is there any danger of
problems with using police officers?
A. Yes, there would be no way
that they would be able to go in,
because they wouldn't allow them in to
begin with, because they don't know
them, and generally they make them
shoot heroin inside the residence and
in that case they wouldn't be able to use
a police officer because he wouldn't be
able to inject a narcotic.
-4-

Q. Do you know, in your
experience as an officer working
in narcotics, if heroin pushers
will usually sell just to anyone?
A. No, they will not."
(Tr.38).
The State's main witness was Ken Goode, an
undercover narcotics1 agent with the Ogden City Police
Department (Tr.l23)c

He testified that he had been a

heroin addict and that on December 9, 1975, he was on
a methadone program (Tr*124).

He admitted that he had

been convicted of drug related felonies previously and
that he had one pending as of the date of the trial
(Tr.125,126)*

When asked why he became a narcotics1

agent, he replied:
lf

A. Well, I was just tired
of my life, tired of the drugs out
there and everything that I had been
involved around, and like I said
before, heroin does a lot of harm,
and I wanted to get myself out of
that kind of life that I was living,
and if I could help other people
by doing what I did, then that is
good too." (Tr.l24)„
Goode also testified that although he had
a charge pending and that he was hopeful his services
to the police department might have some bearing on the
charge, no promises were ever made to him to reduce
the charge in exchange for his services (Tr.126, 164):

-5-

"A. There was no promise
made, I did not ask for any
promise. I went into it to do what
I felt I had to do, to help myself
and like I said before, if I can
help anyone else, and I can be hopeful that I will get some consideration,
but I have not been promised any* I
was not promised prior to it, during
it, or at any time." (Tr*164).
Ken Goodefs testimony inculpating the appellant
was that after he met with the police officers at the
Copper Cottage and was searched and was given $200•00
(Tr.129,130), he drove to 823 West Ellis Street followed
by one of the detectives (Tr.132).

He testified that

when he entered the house he saw one Albert Ross with
whom he had spoken earlier about the proposed buy (Tr.
132,134).

He stated that the appellant came into the

room "a few minutes after I entered." (Trd32).

Goode

testified that he made small talk for a few minutes,
hoping that Albert Ross would bring up "the business at
hand." (Tr.132,133).

According to Goode's testimony,

Ross then asked him if he was " there for the eight,1
referring to the eight balloons of heroin."

Goode

testified that he replied he had, to which Ross
responded by pointing to the appellant who pulled the
heroin from his pocket and laid it on a table (Tr.133).
Goode stated that he took the $200.00 out and tried to
give it to Ross who told him to give it to the appellant.
6-

Goode testified he did so and picked up the heroin*
Goode testified that he did not say
anything after this exchange, claiming that Ross said
a few things to him after which he left promptly (Tr,
135)•

He then stated that he drove to the Copper

Cottage and turned over all eight balloons of heroin
to Officer Searle (Tr*137)«

Although the record is a

little confusing as to when he identified the appellant,
Goode testified that it was December 9th that he identified
the appellant as one of the two individuals who made the
sale of the heroin and that on December 22ndf he made a
further identification from mug shots (Tr.l38f139).
The appellant's defense consisted of witness
testimony designed to impeach Ken Goode by showing his
true motive for making these alleged "buys" as

an under-

cover agent was to get out from under his own felony charge
then pending against him (Tr.192-332)•
ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHETHER THE TESTIMONY OF AN ADMITTED DRUG ADDICT
IS RELIABLE IS A QUESTION FOR THE TRIER OF FACT.
Appellant seems to argue that the undercover
agent*s testimony is inherently defective and unreliable
because he was addicted to drugs and was therefore
-7-

afflicted with a form of insanity called "toxicomania9n
Appellant apparently further argues that this is an
illness that renders Ken Goode incompetent as a witness
against him.

In support of this theory, appellant relies

on Robinson v« California, 370 U«>S. 660 (1962).

In

Robinson, the United States Supreme Court struck down
a California statute which made the"fstatus1 of narcotic
addiction a criminal offense, for which the offender may
be prosecuted fat any time before he reforms.1"
666*

Id., at

The Court in Robinson recognized drug addiction as

an illness for which imprisonment would be cruel and unusual
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Respondent contends that Robinson does not apply
in the instant case.

The United States Supreme Court

did not hold that drug addiction is an illness equivalent
to insanity, thereby rendering all addicts incompetent*
The Court addressed the constitutionality of a statute
that made an individual's status a criminal offense,
rather than his conduct.

In the case at bar, several

witnesses testified that Ken Goode was behaving in a
normal, usual manner on December 9, 1975. Further, the
State introduced David George, the director of the center
for human toxicology for the University of Utah, and a
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member of the faculty of the College of Medicine and the
College of Pharmacy at the University of Utah, to testify
as to the effect of heroin and methadone.

He testified

that the first effect of heroin is a "euphoric, good
feeling or high"

(Tr.90), but that when absorbed over

a long period of time a tolerance develops against the
drug so that the taking of it only prevents withdrawal
symptoms (Tr.91).
Dre George testified as to the effects of
methadone because Ken Goode was on the methadone program
and had taken his methadone the mornijng of December 9,
1975.

Dr. George testified that methadone works on an

individual in the same way as does heroin except that
"a person who takes methadone regularly would also
build up this tolerance to the euphoric effect or good
feeling or high and so forth.11 (Tr„9l,92)*
"Also any other side effects like
nausea or vomiting and so forth with a
few minor exceptions, like a person very
seldom ever builds up a tolerance to
constipation. They are constantly
constipated and they constantly sweat.
Other than that, after they take the
drug for a considerable amount of time,
a few months, they have no good effects
and since it is exactly qualitative
like heroin, they are interchangeable.
That means one is tolerant to heroin
they are also tolerant to methadone and
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one who is tolerant to methadone
is also tolerant to heroin. That
means if you take methadone
regularly every morning and if you
then go ahead a take a shot of
heroin it will have no effect
whatsoever«" (Tr.92). (Emphasis
added.)
Dr. George testified that a person on the
methadone program as was Ken Goode on December 9, 1975,
can function normally and that there are no restrictions
on his activities (Tr.93)*

When asked specifically what

would happen to a person on methadone if he were given a
shot of heroin, Dr. George replied:
"A* With the only restriction,
I assume that we are talking about
being realistic as heroin is shot,
that you buy on the street and so
forth. Nothing.w (Tr.9 3,9 4).
Further, Dr. George testified that someone on the
methadone program would not be hindered in his perception
or ability to recall events while on that program (Tr.94).
Webster's New International Unabridged Dictionary,
Second Edition, defines toxicomania as an "addiction to a
drug, or opium or cocaine."

Without going into the medical

complexities, nowhere in the record or in Webster's is
toxicomania defined as a "form of insanity" as appellant
suggests.

Neither has the United States Supreme Court

decided that drug addiction is a form of insanity.
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The record is replete with evidence that a person
with a heroin addiction on the methadone program as was
Ken Goode at the time of this offense can and does function
normally even if he ingests heroin into his system.

The

record is also replete with evidence that on December 9,
1975, Ken Goode was observed as acting and speaking normally.
Whether the jury believes this evidence and the evidence
supplied by Ken Goode is a matter within their discretion.
In State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah, 1977)f the appellant
argued that the testimony of an undercover agent who
purchased a balloon of heroin in a controlled buy wa£
inherently unreliable because she was a former heroin
user and had a motive to fabricate the story and that
since the agent's testimony was indispensible to the
conviction, there must necessarily have been a reasonable
doubt as to guilt*

This Court struck down that reasoning,

stating:
"The judging of the credibility
of the witnesses and the weight of the
evidence is exclusively the prerogative
of the jury. Consequently, we are
obliged to assume that the jury believed
those aspects of the evidence, and drew
those inferences that reasonably could
be drawn therefrom, in the light favorable
to the verdict.11
In the instant case, the appellant has failed to
rebut the presumption that the trier of fact could reasonably
rely on the testimony of the undercover agent and therefore,
-11-

the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS LEGALLY
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S CONVICTION.
Appellant argues on appeal that there was
insufficient evidence of his guilt to justify a conviction in this case, and that without evidence of guilt, a
conviction violates due process.

He cites Garner v.

Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961), for the proposition that
a conviction totally without evidentiary support is
unconstitutional under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

In Garner, id.f the petitioners

had been convicted of "disturbing the peace" by conducting
themselves in such a manner as "would foreseeably disturb
or alarm the public," id. at 165. The undisputed evidence
was that these Negro petitioners entered some Louisiana
places of eating and quietly took seats where only white
people were customarily served:
"The petitioners not only made
no speeches, they did not even
speak to anyone except to order food;
they carried no placards, and did
nothing beyond their mere presence at
the lunch counter, to attract attention
to themselves or to others. In none of
these cases was there any testimony
that the petitioners were told that
-12-

their mere presence wa$ causing, or
was likely to causet a disturbance of
the peace, nor that the petitioners
were ever asked to leave the counters
or the establishments by anyone connected
with the stores." Id., at 170.
In Garnerf id.f there was absolutely no evidence
to satisfy the elements of the offenste with which the
petitionerswere charged %
88

The undisputed evidence shows
that the police who arrested the
petitioners were left with nothing
to support their actions except their
own opinions that it was a breach of
the peace for the petitioners to sit
peacefully in a place where custom
decreed they should n0t sit. Such
activity, in the circumstances of
these cases, is not evidence of any
crime and cannot be sq consideredf
either by the police 6x by the courts.11
Id. at 174.
Unlike Garnerf in the instant casef tihere existed evidence
of the appellant's guilt.

Ken Goode testified that it

was the appellant who took the eight balloons of heroin from
his pocket and laid it on the table 4nd that it was the
appellant who took the $200.00 as payment for that heroin.
Goode further testified that he identified the appellant
on December 9th and that he identified him also from mug
shots on December 22nd.
There is no question that the State has the burden
of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal
prosecution.

Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910);
-13-

State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272 (Utah, 1975); State v.
Allgood, 28 Utah 2d 119, 499 P.2d 269 (1972); State v.
Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970); State v,
Danks, 10 Utah 2d 162, 350 P.2d 146 (1960); State v.
Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957); State v.
Shonka, 3 Utah 2d 124, 279 P.2d 711 (1955).

The Utah

Supreme Court succinctly stated the requirements for
the sufficiency of evidence to support a guilty verdict
in State v. Allgood, supra.

The evidence is insufficient

if it is "so inconclusive or unsatisfactory that reasonable minds acting fairly upon it must have entertained
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime,"
28 Utah 2d at 120, 449 P.2d at 270. Also, in State v.
Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208, 357 P.2d 183 (1960), the Utah
Supreme Court stated that a guilty verdict may be set
aside when "taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, "the "findings are unreasonable."
Id.*, 11 Utah 2d at 214, 357 P.2d at 186-..'
Whether evidence is sufficient or not to support
a guilty verdict is a factual question for the trier of
fact.

The jury is entitled to believe or disbelieve

witnesses.

In the very recent case of State v. Wilson,

supra, this Court held:
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"The judging of the credibility
of the witnesses and the weight of
the evidence is exclusively the
prerogative of the jury. Consequently,
we are obliged to assume that the jury
believed those aspects of the evidence,
and drew those inferences that reasonably could be drawn therefrom, in the
light favorable to thQ verdict."
Id. at 68.
In the case at barf the only witness who claims to have
seen the appellant inside the house and thus the only
one who can implicate him in this crime is Ken Goode,
the undercover agente

Goode is the person who made the

heroin buy and the one who identified the appellant as
one of the two individuals involved.

The appellant's

defense was to impeach the credibility of Ken Goode.
It is clear from the verdict that in the battle of
who to believe, the jury chose to believe Ken Goode.
It would be a reasonable inference for the jury to draw
that Ken Goode was telling the truth when he said that
his motive for becoming an undercover agent was that he
was "tired of [his] life, tired of the drugs out there
and everything. . .and if [he] could help some other
people by doing what [he] did, then that is good too."
(Tr.124).

It would be a reasonable inference that Ken

Goode was telling the truth when he said that he had
no animosity towards the appellant (Tr.127,128) or that
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he had to fulfill some kind of quota to receive favorable
consideration on his pending felony charge (Tr.126,128).
It is a reasonable inference that Ken Goode was
telling the truth when he testified that the appellant
participated in selling him eight balloons of heroin and
received $200.00 for doing so.
Admittedly, there is some confusion in the
record as to when Ken Goode identified the appellant.
Officer Searle stated that Goode identified Ross as the
man with whom he made the arrangements for the buy.
Searle testified that he did not recall whether Goode
knew the appellant prior to the buy or not, but that in
any event Goode identified the appellant when he was
shown mug shots.

Searle also testified that showing

the undercover agent mug shots for identification was
standard procedure, and that Goode probably was shown
the photographs on December 9 (Tr.75,76).

Ken Goode

testified that when he made his statement of the
incident he used the appellant's name (Tr.138).

Goode

also stated he picked the appellant's photograph out
of the mug shots on December 9 and on December 22 (Tr.
138,139).

Goode explained that the later identification

was for the purpose of identifying another person (Tr.
139).

-16-

In any event, the question raised by the
appellant does not relate to a faulty identification
but rather when it was made*

Ken Goodefs testimony of

his identification of the appellant was sufficiently
corroborated by Officer Searle, thereby giving it more
credibility.

The jury was entitled to believe the

accuracy of the identification.
POINT III
^HE PROSECUTOR MADE NO REMARKS REGARDING
THE FACT THAT THE APPELLANT DID NOT TESTIFY THAT
COULD HAVE PREJUDICED THE APPELLANT.
in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965),
the United States Supreme Court held that California's
practice of commenting on the fact that a defendant
did not take the stand in his own defense was unconstitutional as it put a penalty on the exercise of a
person's right not to be compelled to be a witness
against hiriiseif , guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to
the United states Constitution*

In (phapman v. California,

386 U.S. IS (1967), the United State$ Supreme Court
expanded on this, holding that even though it is error
for a prosecutor

to comment on the absence of the

defendant's; testimony, it may be a harmless constitutional
error; to be so, however, the State must demonstrate
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beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's comments
(and in Chapman, the trial judge's instructions)/ did
not contribute to the defendant's conviction.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue
specifically in State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah, 1975),
in which the defendant sought a reveral of his conviction
on the sole ground that the prosecutor prejudicially
commented in his closing argument concerning the defendant's
failure to testify at trial.
the prosecutor's comments

The defendant complained that

"The defense has presented no

evidence as to why the defendant was out there [at the
construction cite where building materials were stolen]•
What was he doing out there?"—were prejudicial to him*
In formulating a standard, the Utah Supreme Court discussed
the variant interests involved in this issue:
"It is not to be doubted that the
right of a defendant not to testify in
a criminal trial is a fundamental right
protected by both the federal and the
Utah Constitutions* Its exercise should
in no way prejudice him in the eyes of
the court or jury. He need give no
reason; and there should be no concern
as to his reason for not testifying.
The simple and immutable fact is, that
for what we accept as good and sufficient
reasons, the privilege has been long
established that comments concerning
an accused's failure to testify, however,
adroitly disguised, may have the effect
of impairing or destroying the privilege?
and that this should not be done.
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The other side of this proposition
is: that the prosecutor, and the public,
whose interest he representsr should and
does have a right to argue the case upon
the basis of the total picture shown by
the evidence or the lack thereof. If
either counsel cannot voice a challenge
to the effect of the total evidence, then
one is made to wonder, what may he talk
about? It is our opinion that it is not
only the prerogative, but the duty of
either counsel, to analyze all aspects of
the evidence; and this should include any
pertinent statements or deductions reasonably to be drawn therefrom as to what the
evidence is or is not, and what it does
or does not show. The prosecutor's
comment under scrutiny here falls within
the principle just stated; and he made
no direct reference to the fact that the
defendant had not taken the stand.
This problem has arisen in sister
states who have ruled that statements of
the nature here involved are legitimate
comments on what the total evidence does
or does not show, and are not violative
of the constitutional right defendant
asserts." Id. at 951.
In the case at bar, the appellant cites prosecutorial
statements out of context.

The comments complained of are

located at Tr.343, 344:
"That is basically the State's case.
We believe that the evidence is proven
here beyond a reasonable doubt that this
defendant was the one that sold the
material to the undercover agent.
What about the defendant's case?
What does the defendant tell us? The
defendant's entire attack, of course,
is on the credibility of Mr. Goode and
probably rightly so because he is the
only one, he and the defendant, that
really know what took place in that
house.
-19-

What did defense counsel tell you
when he started? He said that Mr. Goode
was lying, that Mr, Goode wasn't telling
us the truth about what actually happened
on that day. He said in his opening
remarks that we're going to prove to
you that Mr. Goode was out to get all the
blacks in the community, that Mr. Goode1s
wife was a prostitute and that her pimp,
as he called it, was a black. Well you
know ladies and gentlemen, I listened
to the entire defense in this case and I
never heard one shred of evidence from the
defendant to prove any motive, any reason,
that showed that Ken Goode was out to get
blacks in the community. No evidence at all
has been presented to you members of this
jury that really proved that particular
contention.
What else did he tell you? He told
you that the only reason that Ken Goode
made these cases, the only reason that
he made this particulcir case against this
defendant was because he had some charges
hanging over his head and he thought if he
trumped-up or made up enough stories that
the people in the community, that they would
certainly go easy on him. Is there any
evidence to support that contention that
the defendant makes."
The comments of this prosecutor clearly fall
within "the

duty. . .to analyze all aspects of the

evidence. . •(including). . .any pertinent statements or
deductions reasonably to be drawn therefrom as to what
the evidence is or is not and what it does or does not
show."

Id. at 951.
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Moreover, even if these comments could be
considered directed towards the appellant's failure
to testify, these are not the sort of comments
that could be considered prejudicial error to hinw
Something more than mere error is required by both
Chapman v. United States, supra, and [State v. Kazda,
supra;
"There is another consideration
supportive of our conclusion that
there was no prejudicial error here*
Defendant makes no cor^tention or even
suggestion concerning his innocence*
His argument falls in the pattern which
has become so usual in criminal cases in
recent times; that there was an
irregularity or error in the proceedings.
We are under the mandate of our statute,
and of well established decisional law that
we should not reverse a conviction for
mere error or irregularity (neither of
which exists here) bui^ would do so
only if there were error which had a
substantial effect upon the defendantys
right to a fair trial in that in the
absence of the error there is reasonable
likelihood that there Vfould have been a
different result. " Kaz[da at 951. (Emphasis
added.)
Finally, the appellant failed to make any
objection to these statements, and by failing to do so,
he waived the objection.

In Kazda, the defendant

objected to the prosecutor's comment^ and moved for a
mistrial which was denied.

The triaj. court admonished
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the jury to disregard the prosecutor's comments and:
". • .reminded them that
counsel's statements are not
evidence* He further directed
the jury to follow the instructions
previously given concerning the
defendant's privilege of not
testifying; and that they should
draw no inferences as to his guilt
therefrom* It is also shown that
the prosecutor had himself reminded
the jury of that instruction; and
that defense counsel re-emphasized
this principle in his argument."
Id. at 951.
This Court concluded its opinion by underscoring

the

rehabilitative effect of these admonishments:
"If it be assumed that there
is any possibility that the prosecutor's
comment complained of was prejudicial
to the defendant/ this was rectified
insofar as that possibly could be donef
even on a retrialf by the timely
reiteration of the correct principles
by the court, reinforced by the
arguments of both counsel." Id., at
952.
In the instant case, appellant cannot now complain
that these comments were prejudicial when he afforded the
trial court no opportunity to rectify what he now considers
prejudicial.
Respondent submits that the comments made by the
prosecutor were in no way prejudicial to the outcome of
appellant's trial and that even if they could be considered
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error, appellant waived his objection by failing to
timely object*
POINT IV
THE APPELLANT KNOWINGLY RELINQUISHED HIS
RIGHT TO HEAR THE TESTIMONY OF OFFICER BRUESTLE AND
KENT GLANVILLE BY STIPULATION.
At noon on the day of his trial, the appellant,
together with his two attorneysf Maurice Richards and
John Cainef and the prosecutor appeared before the trial
judge in his chambers*

The purpose of this proceeding

was for appellant1s counsel, Mr* Richardsf to propose a
stipulation of the testimony to be offered by Officer Bruestle
and Kent Glanville« Officer Bruestle was to testify that
he removed the eight balloons of heroin from the evidence
lockerf that he placed it in the evidence room and that
he turned it over to Kent Glanville, the chemist*

He

was to also testify that the heroin was returned to the
evidence room and that it was released from his care and
custody at the preliminary hearing and introduced in
evidence there and finally that it has been in the custody
and control of the Clerkfs office since that time (Tr.85f
86).
Kent Glanville was to testify that he analyzed
the eight balloons and ascertained that they were in fact
heroin (Tr.86).

The record reveals that the trial judge asked
the appellant if he understood what his counsel wanted
to do for him, to which the appellant responded that he
did:
"THE COURT: Show the presence of
Mr* Richards, the Defendant, Mr. Jones
and the Court personnel. [Sic—also
Mr. Caine.]
You must understand that this type
of stipulation cannot be entered into
without your consent. If you want to
hear the evidence you have the right to
hear the evidence. You understand this?
MR. EATON: Yes, I understand that.
THE COURT: What Mr. Richards
wants to do is probably a matter of
trial strategy. Maybe he doesnft want
to lose to the jury or something else.
Otherwise you can talk to him about his
personal reasons for wanting to do it or
not do it. You understand that he cannot
do it without your consent.
MR. EATON: Yes, sir; Your Honor.11
(Tr.85).
The trial judge then requested what was the nature of the
proposed stipulation.

For the next few moments the

prosecutor and the appellant's lawyers discussed this
agreement in the appellant's presence.

Thusf contrary

to what the appellant now contends, the record is not
silent as to him being informed of his right to hear
these witness's testimonies. Appellant heard the trial
court inform him of his right to hear the evidence, and
indicated that he understood this.
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Moreover, the fact

that it was his own attorneys1 proposal and that he does
not challenge their competence to represent him, he should
not now be permitted to retract his statement on the
record that he made an understanding waiver,
CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that appellant
has failed to show that the evidence at trial was
insufficient to justify a conviction, that he was in
any way prejudiced by the prosecutorfs comments in
summation, or that he did not make an understanding waiver
of his right to hear two witnesses when his own lawyers
arranged a stipulation of their testimony•

Respondent

respectfully requests that this Court affirm the verdict
and judgment of the lower court.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT Be HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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